Critiquing the concept of multistakeholder governance of food security
By Nora McKeon
This entry is part of a special series of blog posts about the UN’s Committee on World Food Security (CFS): The Future of the CFS? Collectively reflecting on the directions of UN’s most inclusive body. Read more about this project here. This is not an exclusive project. If you would like to participate, please let us know: firstname.lastname@example.org
Last week Carolin Anthes reflected on the role of human rights in the CFS and across the UN system. This week we launch the third thematic cluster of this series: CFS: Multi-stakeholder or multi-actor? And does it matter? In this post, Nora McKeon presents a critique of the rise of multistakeholder processes in food security governance, warning that a failure to take power imbalances and interests into account is working to reinforce the corporate food regime.
Before Brexit and the US elections, Nature magazine columnist Colin Macilwain set out a challenge: “If Donald Trump were to trigger a crisis in Western democracy, scientists would need to look at their part in its downfall.”
Now Trump has become president, the possibility of crisis is real, including the spectre of a “Twitter ban” for scientists. So what of scientific introspection?
Macilwain argues that the scientific elite is inextricably linked to the centrist, free-market political establishment. In their continuous pursuit of funding, scientists reinforce the ruling nexus of politics and finance, oblivious to the evident cracks in the system.
Alternatively, researchers and policy-makers could acknowledge the existence of a problem but dismiss it as something to be treated with topical remedies. For example, one recent analysis shows how bad incentives drive off good science by sustaining a state of affairs that systematically encourages malpractice.
But responses from the field seem to conceive of the problem as one that requires only a refined technical solution from within the scientific establishment, not fundamental reforms.
Even a recent manifesto for reproducible science, which lists measures to improve key elements of the scientific process including methods, reporting and dissemination, reproducibility, evaluation and incentives, aims only to make science more efficient.
We argue that the present scientific crisis emerges, in part, from uncritically applying to science a mainstream economics concept of efficiency, unavoidably associated with measurements and metrics, when metrics are seen instead by many as part of the problem.
Diversion and displacement
Diversion is another way to avoid addressing the current problems with science.
Because science is under threat, then, it holds that scientists should close ranks and reject criticism, as they have done in the past when faced with postmodern critiques.
This position feeds onto a persistent Cult of Science, portraying science as the master narrative to adjudicate on the full range of human and societal affairs, and scientists as a nobler domain of humanity.
Last but not least, displacement is perhaps the most widespread response, judging by the insistent claims about the onset of the post-truth era. This position implies that before Brexit and President Trump, we were living in a world where truth was commonplace in policy and politics.
The mistakes of the lay public should not be taken as an excuse to overlook science’s own faults. Let us not forget the parallel cases of Love Canal in the 1970s, and Flint, Michigan and Washington, DC today, where the same script seems to repeat itself, with residents having to rely on their own scientists to expose the truth.
What went wrong with science?
In one recent analysis, we suggest that science is in crisis because of contradictions between the practice and structure of science, and its public image and social roles.
In his 1963 book, Little Science, Big Science, Derek de Solla Price described how the small-scale, single-project research activities that characterised most scientific work in through the mid-20th century shifted dramatically to big science after the second world war. This resulted from the impressive growth in the scientific production and workforce, and was characterised by large projects requiring advanced technologies.
De Solla Price speculated that this current context might one day lead to a senility of science.
Our analysis – which owes to earlier works by philosopher Jerome Ravetz – follows on to argue that the sheer scale of science today is destroying the disciplinary peer communities of little science and demanding objective metrics of quality, which encourage perverse incentives and are subject to corruption.
No quantitative and formalised system of quality control can replace the old, informal system. Instead, resolution will require people and institutions beyond the scientific system.
For political scientist Dan Sarewitz, the degradation of science is also due to its engagement in what he calls a “trans-scientific” endeavour, meaning a problem that can be expressed scientifically but is not amenable to a scientific solution via existing scientific means.
Obesity, for example, seems to be a scientifically soluble problem only if we neglect the extremely complex chain of possible causes which could contribute to the condition.
Sarewitz argues that the miracles of modernity came not from “the free play of free intellects but from the leashing of scientific creativity to the technological needs of the US Department of Defense.”
From this perspective, the ongoing problems with reproducibility in scientific experiments result from researchers choosing to study trans-scientific issues to maximise their funding and publication metrics. Even though science is better, for Sarewitz, when constrained by clear mandates and control, for example, at the service of a market-driven technological development.
Still, the idea that “market” and “innovation” keep science clean begs the question of who keeps market and innovation clean?
What should be done?
Though science is often put at odds with religion, there share similarities in that both function as worldviews. And despite their existential crises, religion and science remain a source of hope for many.
For this reason, it is perhaps not far-fetched to look at the crisis of the church to gain insights for the scientific field.
Martin Luther started his Protestant Reformation in an outraged reaction to generalised corruption – economic and intellectual – within the church. Monk John Tetzel, who was selling indulgences (a remission to the amount of punishment a sinner has to undergo after death) in Germany around 1517, was an example of such corruption.
Today’s science crisis also reveals how the combination of corruption, rage and new technology can mobilise major social change.
Reconstructing science would require a broad democratic constituency, including humanists, technologists and citizen activists, as well as scientists, investigative journalists and whistleblowers.
At the moment, however, creating a blueprint for such a reformation seems delusional: we live in an age of increasing fragmentation, not inclusion.
We must be able to question the idol of objective truth without being accused of postmodern relativism. We must also critically view the co-evolution of science and power that Macilwain alludes to.
Any worldview shift today, scientific or otherwise, must also reconsider the present economic paradigm.
Science in society
None of these structural changes is easy to achieve, of course. So what we suggest, while conditions for this global critique ripen, is that science is at its best when it is explicitly embedded in society, enhancing knowledge rights to an extended peer community.
Taking cases of environmental degradation such as Love Canal or Flint discussed above, it is clear that corrupt administrations, operators and regulators, with their own science, may concur to produce disasters.
Here an extended peer community of concerned citizens and willing scientists can identify the problem and its possible solutions.
Citizens have the right to engage with ideological and political debates about science and question the governance processes that produced these failures. Instead, right now, they’re just being called to defend science from its purported enemies.
This entry is part of a special series of blog posts about the UN’s Committee on World Food Security (CFS): The Future of the CFS? Collectively reflecting on the directions of UN’s most inclusive body. Read more about this project here.
We quick off the first post of the year by continuing with our third the thematic cluster: “CFS: Multi-stakeholder or multi-actor? And does it matter?” In this post, Matheus brings us a national-level example, the Brazilian National Council on Food and Nutrition Security, aka CONSEA, and argues that more conceptual precision is needed when comparing and assessing the transformative potential of multi-stakeholder platforms.
This is not an exclusive project. If you would like to participate, please let us know: email@example.com
If you have been following the CFS and food security governance at the…
I would like to warmly recommend Katrina Brown’s new book entitled “Resilience, development and global change”. I found it a thoughtful, authoritative book that links and transcends several deeply entrenched ideas and discourses. As such, I think it is an excellent input (or even entry point) for people working on social-ecological systems – especially, but not only in the Global South.
The book articulates different, partly conflicting understandings of resilience, both in science and policy arenas. This overview of existing perspectives is useful, simply because resilience is used in so many different ways, by so many different people, that it’s helpful to get an overview of who actually means what. A key point here is that in much of development policy, resilience is employed to argue for status quo approaches to development. Perhaps needless to say, that’s a long way from the paradigm shift some…
Last month I visited the Stockholm Resilience Centre. Among other things, I gave a talk on our food security and biodiversity research. The resulting video was originally posted on the Resilience Centre’s website. I am reproducing it here to give an update of where our work (and thinking) is at.
Founded in 2014, the Open Source Seed Initiative (OSSI) is dedicated to maintaining fair and open access to plant genetic resources worldwide in order to ensure the availability of germplasm to farmers, gardeners, breeders, and communities of this and future generations. (From http://osseeds.org/about/.)
And re-posted below is a blog post from our Executive Director, Claire Luby. The original can be found here, and of course info to your heart’s desire can be found at the OSSI Webpage and Facebook page.
The OSSI Community continues to grow and thrive. We’ve been working with plant breeders and seed companies to expand the open source seed offerings available to gardeners, farmers and plant breeders of this and future generations. We currently list nearly 300 OSSI-Pledged varieties bred by 34 Plant Breeders and offered for sale by 38 seed companies! We’ve also been working on developing partnerships with organizations such as Seed Savers Exchange, grocery stores, and seed libraries to spread the word about OSSI and open source seed.
OSSI has received high-profile media attention in both popular magazines and academic journals. The major popular article features from last seed catalog season include:
Forthcoming promotion for OSSI will include the release in December of a Peak Moments TV/YouTube interview with Carol Deppe, complete with OSSI songs. In addition, there will be a 4,000-word article by Carol in the Jan. (Seed) 2017 issue of Acres/USA on “Thirty-three Great Open Source Organic-Adapted Vegetable Varieties.”
We’ve made some new additions to our OSSI leadership team. We were excited to welcome CR Lawn, founder and CFO of Fedco Seeds, to our Board of Directors in winter of 2016. CR founded Fedco Seeds, a hybrid consumer/worker farm and garden products cooperative in 1978 and has been one of its managing coordinators since. He is responsible for much of the distinctive writing and vivid variety descriptions in the Fedco Seed catalogs. CR holds a JD from Yale Law School. His contributions include past membership on the board of MOFGA and as Chair of the Common Ground Fair Steering Committee. He was a contributing editor of Organic Seed Production and Saving by Bryan Connolly (Chelsea Green, 2011) and of The Heritage Grain Grower by Eli Rogosa (Chelsea Green, 2016), and has written and spoken extensively on topics of economics and issues around seeds, farming and genetic engineering. We are thrilled that he is bringing his extensive experience and wisdom to the OSSI Board of Directors.
In June, Claire Luby started as our first half-time Executive Director. Claire is a co-founder of OSSI as well as a member of the Board of Directors, and as an experimentalist, has provided foundation data and germplasm to guide the theory and practice of open source plant breeding in the future. Claire recently completed her Ph.D. in Plant Breeding and Plant Genetics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Her thesis focused on assessing genetic variation and freedom to operate in a large collection of U.S.A. carrot cultivars, the first such study to be conducted for any crop. In addition, in collaboration with Irwin Goldman, Claire developed eight intellectual-property-free populations of carrot germplasm based upon market and color classes and released them as OSSI-Pledged varieties, thus providing ideal sources of material that all interested can use to breed new open source carrot varieties. In addition to her Executive Director appointment, Claire continues her research on genetic diversity and intellectual property rights through her half-time postdoctoral position at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Board Member Jahi Chappell recently moved from his position as a Senior Scientist and Director of Agroecology and Agriculture Policy at the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy in Minneapolis, MN to being a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Agroecology, Water, and Resilience at Coventry University in the UK. There he will conduct collaborative transdisciplinary research and connect with communities in order to analyze, coordinate, and develop actions and policies to create a sustainable, decentralized, and deeply democratic food and agriculture system. Jahi has also been busy writing his first book, Beginning to End Hunger, which will be published by University of California Press in 2017. Being based in the UK, Jahi will be able to better support our UK-based Seed Company Partners and explore greater cooperation with breeders, seed companies, and others in the UK and EU.
OSSI has wrestled with the question of whether to go with a fully legally enforceable Pledge since our inception. Ultimately, we decided on our current Pledge, agreeing that working on the moral and ethical plane best fit our style and values. However, we raised the question of the legality of our Pledge with our lawyers. They advised us that they believe the Pledge to be legally enforceable.
We have continued to work through how the Pledge operates on a practical level for seed companies and breeders. After consulting with our breeder and seed company partners, we have developed guidelines for contracts and licenses that protect the full rights of farmers, gardeners and plant breeders to use seed, but that also allow the sort of seed multiplication and benefit sharing arrangements that facilitate seed production. Our formal policy is as follows:
The Open Source Seed Initiative permits any contract or agreement for seed increase and/or benefit sharing for OSSI-Pledged varieties in which the restrictions on the use of the seeds are limited to the two contracting parties. OSSI does not accept arrangements in which there are restrictions on the seed that extend beyond the two contracting parties. Seed companies can pass no restrictions on to breeders or customers. From the point of view of breeders or customers, OSSI-Pledged varieties must be unrestricted.
What freedoms does the Pledge protect? In order to better communicate to a wide variety of audiences exactly what freedoms the OSSI Pledge is protecting, we have developed the “Four Open Source Seed Freedoms” to explain what it means for a variety to be released under the OSSI Pledge.
The Four Open Source Seed Freedoms are:
The freedom to save or grow seed for replanting or for any other purpose.
The freedom to share, trade, or sell seed to others.
The freedom to trial and study seed and to share or publish information about it.
The freedom to select or adapt the seed, make crosses with it, or use it to breed new lines and varieties
When you buy, grow, or breed with OSSI varieties, and when you pass the Pledge along with the seed, you are protecting, extending and perpetuating these four essential seed freedoms.
Claire Luby is half-time Executive Director of OSSI and half-time postdoctoral researcher at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in plant breeding and plant genetics. Claire’s research examines the impact of intellectual property rights on freedom to operate for plant breeding. Claire is also a co-founder of the Student Organic Seed Symposium (Photo credit: Matthew Dillon)
The following is the first of a series of upcoming summaries of preliminary findings from our ERC funded research. Details are subject to change.
Maintaining biodiversity is a global challenge. Some scientists have argued for strictly protected forest areas, while others have suggested that farmland also can have conservation value. To assess the conservation value of farmland and forest for woody species diversity in southwestern Ethiopia, we investigated six kebeles in Jimma Zone. We identified woody plant species in 78 randomly selected 20 m x 20 m sample plots in forest and homegardens; and in 72 randomly selected 1 ha sites in arable land and pastures. We found 96 and 122 plant species in forest and farmland, respectively. In forest, woody plant composition was affected by coffee management practices, current and historical distance to farmland, and the effort required by local people to reach a given site (so-called “cost distance”). Mean species richness ranged from 13 at the forest edge to…
I am despondent and in shock after Tuesday night’s election results in the U.S. I had thought I would wake up Wednesday morning with a narrow Clinton victory and a sense that America had dodged a bullet. A Trump win was unfathomable to me – and now I must contemplate the unthinkable: Donald Trump as my president.
What do you do when a narcissistic, racist, nativist, sexist bully wins the fight on the playground and seemingly half the crowd was rooting for him? The short answer is that you get up, think hard about what just happened, go back to work, and continue to fight the good fight. Nonetheless, I really didn’t need another existential reminder that the most qualified person doesn’t always win, and that fear, manipulation and power sometimes rule the day.
The charitable side of me would like to believe that this was a working class revolt…
(c) Mark Fusco 2016. From the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative’s MultiCultural Festival 2016: ImagiNations Without Borders. See https://www.facebook.com/dsni.org
This piece by Nicholas Hildyard, titled “Blood and Culture: Ethnic Conflict and the Authoritarian Right,” seems absolutely necessary for today.
Slate’s Jamelle Bouie and others are pushing back on the idea that the white working class support for Trump is primarily class-based, rather than rooted in racist and xenophobic resentment and fear. I’ve argued that they can’t be cleanly separated, which I’d think Hildyard would concur with. At the same time, he warned — way back in 1999! — that
Though necessary, the focus on the visible structures of economic exclusion (TNCs, neoliberal trade treaties and the like) has led to a partial obscuring of other, concurrent forms of exclusion — not least the newly-reworked ideologies which currently underpin and legitimise much discrimination.86 “Blood” and “culture” explanations of ethnic conflict are just two examples.
As a consequence, the ground on which globalisation is increasingly being challenged is ground that is as easily occupied by elements of the authoritarian but radical Right as it is by the progressive Left. The impression often gained is that the challenge to globalisation forms a platform shared by both Left and Right.
In reality, no such common platform exists: there are authoritarian responses to globalisation and there are progressive responses — and the two strands are confused at peril.
If I’m not mistaken, this is what Bouie and others (like my friend Stephen Robinson) are getting at, at least in part… that compromise and common cause cannot and must not be made with authoritarians around real and legitimate concerns and marginalization of many communities, including white working class communities.
A platform shared with authoritarian interests inevitably legitimises those interests, giving them a credibility that they might otherwise not enjoy.89…such platforms send a public message to many groups who might otherwise be allies that progressives are prepared to set aside certain core issues (anti-racism, for example) in the fight against globalisation… the failure to place opposition to the ideologies underpinning social exclusion on a par with opposition to economic exclusion gives wider scope for authoritarian interests to shape the localisms that are emerging in response to corporate rule — scope which might not be so available if the focus of opposition was not concentrated so exclusively on economic exclusion.
Attractive — and necessary — as it might be to evolve as wide an opposition to globalisation as possible, it is surely also critical to have in mind where that opposition is likely to lead. The alliances that progressives enter into — albeit tacitly — will inevitably influence the outcome of their opposition. If they are serious in their commitment to “localisms” that are cosmopolitan, open and equitable, it is not enough to “talk the talk”. More important still is to “walk the walk” — for whom we chose to walk with ultimately plays a large part in determining where we end up walking. (emphasis added)
To elaborate on my confusion, this is a key element, to my read, of Bouie’s argument that “Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren Are Screwing Up the Resistance to Donald Trump”:
It seems reasonable for Warren and Sanders to make a distinction between Trump as blue-collar populist and Trump as racist demagogue. But that distinction doesn’t exist. Supporting a Trump-branded infrastructure initiative as a discrete piece of policy where two sides can find common ground only bolsters a white-nationalist politics, even if you oppose the rest of Trump’s agenda. It legitimizes and gives fuel to white tribalism as a political strategy. It shows that there are tangible gains for embracing Trump-style demagoguery. Likewise, it seems reasonable to want to recast support for Trump as an expression of populism. But Trump’s is a racial populism—backed almost entirely by white Americans, across class lines—that revolves around demands to reinforce existing racial and status hierarchies.
Where I perhaps started getting lost with the details of Bouie’s argument was the contrast he makes with Harry Reid’s statements. He quotes Warren:
“There are millions of people who did not vote for Donald Trump because of the bigotry and hate that fueled his campaign rallies. They voted for him despite hate,” Warren said in a speech after the election. “They voted for him out of frustration and anger—and also out of hope that he would bring change.”
And goes on
Both Warren and Sanders emphasize that bigotry was part of Trump’s message. But they want to separate the “deplorables” from the larger group of more ordinary Americans who just wanted a change of pace. And to that end, they both promise to work with Trump provided he chooses a populist agenda.
In contrast, he writes
There is an alternative to the rhetoric of Warren and Sanders that gets you to the same place without the same pitfalls. Following Trump’s election, outgoing Nevada Sen. Harry Reid issued this statement.
I have personally been on the ballot in Nevada for 26 elections and I have never seen anything like the reaction to the election completed last Tuesday. The election of Donald Trump has emboldened the forces of hate and bigotry in America.
We as a nation must find a way to move forward without consigning those who Trump has threatened to the shadows. Their fear is entirely rational, because Donald Trump has talked openly about doing terrible things to them. …
If this is going to be a time of healing, we must first put the responsibility for healing where it belongs: at the feet of Donald Trump, a sexual predator who lost the popular vote and fueled his campaign with bigotry and hate. Winning the electoral college does not absolve Trump of the grave sins he committed against millions of Americans. Donald Trump may not possess the capacity to assuage those fears, but he owes it to this nation to try.
Reid doesn’t preclude cooperation; this isn’t a call for blockade. What the Nevada senator does, however, is center the fears and concerns of nonwhite Americans. He essentially offers conditional terms: If you work to reduce and repudiate the fear and hate of your campaign, then there is a chance to “move forward.” Otherwise, there are no deals to make. Reid’s statement has all the room you need for a populist message to working-class whites. But it makes that message contingent on buy-in for an inclusive agenda.
I suppose the key element where I basically got myself lost is that I see little hope, and have little interest, in the tactics of individual politicians. I have only vague interest in what Warren and Bernie do — ok, that’s not true, I find them keenly interesting, and they obviously wield incredible influence, but in terms of addressing long-term structural problems, I look to their leadership about equally as much as I look to John Oliver, which is to say, far from zero, but not as my bedrock interest. But what I mean is that, party politics does not interest me as the way forward. I’ve long been very interested in the terms of decadal-level change. And while our current electoral system is part of that — of course — I tend to see it more as the object for change than the lever for it.
So while our politicians should not cooperate with Donald Trump without demanding a repudiation of his bigoted campaign and promises, I agree there, I also think we as citizens and communities do need to find ways to cooperate with those who may have voted for Trump. (I know, some of my smartest friends disagree with this and are skeptical of the tractability–if any–there is for supporters of Trump’s racism, misogyny, and demogoguery.) On the one hand, even in the most vicious and outwardly violent conflicts, you have to negotiate with–and eventually allow empathy for–those on a different side than you. An incredible amount of fiction (and nonfiction) has written about the parallels of treating one’s enemy as inhuman. After all, an enemy who is irredeemably Other can only be killed or vanquished, not negotiated with and eventually lived beside. And of course, the accomplishments of US Civil Rights movements–efforts which are obviously, painfully incomplete–did not occur based purely on ostracization of racists. While we needed rhetoric of not one single figure, but rather the likes of MLK, Malcolm X, Fannie Lou Hamer, James Baldwin, all, and more than them besides — that is, a plethora of approaches and analyses, and analysts and analyses that changed over time. While one could reasonably characterize civil rights advancements as “You’re either with [racism], or you will act with us against [it],” space must be made, at the same time, FOR this “acting against it.”
So that is where I slightly differ from Bouie’s analysis. It is not a contradiction, per se, but a difference in emphasis. While it is important how our politicians deal with Trump, to me, far more important is how we figure out how to deal with each other. We need more spaces and venues to talk — and deliberate and HAVE EFFECTS (e.g. change spending, priorities, and the like) — with those we may not already agree with. We need concrete opportunities where we can say “we are committed to supporting marginalized communities and have no place for racism, patriarchy, xenophobia, or heterosexism” but then the opportunity to show this commitment can actually lead to some kind of material effect. This work will be tricky, as it will require including, for example, Trump voters — to work with a community cannot be “work with the part of the community you identify with,” and we cannot approach it as “work with the part of the community you don’t have open contempt for.” Threading the balance–of building inclusive spaces, but requiring their foundation on shared dignity and substantive equality and recognition of difference–is INCREDIBLY difficult. But there are examples out there. And to my mind, how to create, maintain, grow, and EMPOWER them (e.g. with DECISION-MAKING power for policy and social spending) is the far more interesting, and in the long term clearly (to me) more important question than how our Senators should negotiate the important, but vastly unrepresentative and ultimately dysfunctional, halls of established power.
Whaddaya think? This crown too understated? Anyway, our war with Guilder is gonna be YUGE. I will MAKE FLORIN GREAT AGAIN.
To say that post mortems/analyses of the recent US election are thick on the ground is like saying that throwing a penny at the moon is unlikely to move it — a bit of an understatement. But that’s not going to stop me from wading in as well.
Like many, I have lots of thoughts on the whole thing, many of which are contradictory. I’m not nearly as surprised as some, nor particularly peeved at FiveThirtyEight.com (which I’ve read religiously the past months, and which predicted a Clinton win — but only at odds that gave her a 2 out of 3 or so chance of winning; in other words, a highly plausible forecast that still seems plausible from here!). But I am surprised. And while I felt like I could make some sense of the results, and support for Trump to a certain extent (e.g. “Why the impulse to vote for “That dude/tte I can have a beer with” makes sense: a progressive perspective“), there was some element of it I still couldn’t get. Why, no matter how “un-PC” he was, was Trump seen as a dogged, consistent truth-teller when his points were obviously improv’ed to calculatingly give himself whatever advantage? Why were his every vacillation allowed for, even while others were hammered for straying from their past stances and promises? Why was his obvious mendacity for his own ends not seen as reason to doubt that he was out “for the little guy”? And how could his sales pitch of bringing help to Whites feeling downtrodden work when they were also seemingly deeply skeptical of elites, when not only is he an elite, but his mantra is obviously “screw ’em if it suits me”?
Part of all of this, to be sure, is the difference in perception, media consumption, background, values, and attention between me and many of his supporters. But something more fundamental and, with regards to specific political issues, inchoate may be going on, something that comes out in this Guardian article, among many other pieces. That is simply this:
Humans have a deep-seated tendency and drive to punish breaches of community contracts, and are often willing to pay rather steep costs just to punish those they see as having transgressed and in danger of getting away with it.
In other words, we deeply want the “bad guys” to get it in the end.
Grandson: Who kills Prince Humperdinck? At the end. Somebody’s got to do it. Is it Inigo, who?
Grandfather: Nobody. Nobody kills him. He lives.
Grandson: You mean he wins? Jesus, Grandpa, what did you read me this thing for?
The Princess Bride (1987)
While many on the Left might immediately associate Trump with Humperdinck, before his run brought all the attention his way (which is obviously his favorite thing ever and always), many on the Left and Right could continue to agree that Much Was Broken in Washington, D.C., if not U.S. democracy more broadly. Trump, who is the most hated major party candidate (and now President-elect) in the history of modern polling, managed to beat out Hillary Clinton, who is the second-most hated major party candidate in the history of modern polling. While I do believe some portion of the hate for her is misogyny, there is also much to detest within her own record (though I personally rated the verdammt emails pretty far down on that list, waaaaay after, say, her partial responsibility for the assassination of Honduran activists as a result of US support the Honduran coup during her tenure at State).
Without getting further into the details: beyond Sanders and Trump, there was plenty of evidence that many, many people are fed up with the political system as is, with business as usual, with the paralysis in many elements in our national government (leaving aside the source of this), with the perception (and reality) of corruption, special interests, rampant lobbying and cronyism, and lack of direct accountability.
Something like a quarter of his own voters reportedly viewed Trump as unqualified and of questionable temperament, and 17% of his voters said they were concerned or scared at the prospect of him as President. Further,
“The majority of voters had unfavorable impressions of both. Twelve percent of Clinton voters and 20 percent of Trump voters had an unfavorable opinion of the candidate for whom they opted. So despite their misgivings about the candidates, something still compelled them to support one of them.
Both candidates were seen as not being honest or trustworthy by more than 6 out of 10 voters. However, among white voters, 57 percent said Trump was not honest and trustworthy while fully 70 percent said the same of Clinton. Almost 3 in 10 white voters said neither candidate was honest and trustworthy. Among this group, Trump won 52 percent to Clinton’s 32 percent.”
Trump, in other words, won decisively among white voters who thought both choices were dubious.
Prominent institutional economists Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis wrote, nearly two decades ago, that
It is little surprise that people are more generous than economics textbooks allow; more remarkable is that they are equally unselfish in seeking to punish, often at great cost to themselves, those who have done harm to them and others…
…[people] are willing to incur a cost to punish those whom they perceive to have treated them, or a group to which they belong, badly. In everyday life, we see people consumed with the desire for revenge against those who have harmed them or their families, even where no material gain can be expected…
…the self-serving behavior of [a] minority… when it goes unpunished, unravels initial generosity and cooperation
The perceptions that some groups–minorities, immigrants, wealthy elites, and political power-brokers and politicians–have been the beneficiaries of self-serving policies and identity politics is powerful, persistent, and hard to counter, especially with the profound social distance (lack of contact with differing sociocultural communities) often observed in the U.S. Without direct, and perhaps sustained, social contact, it is hard to convince someone who thinks they’re being fleeced for others’ benefit that the “others” have not gotten undeserved consideration.
So while a lot is going on, and we’re still learning and understanding a lot of it, it seems to me that the narrative of “I’m going to punish Washington/politicians/undeserving Others” is an important part of it, and the lack of understanding on the part of some doesn’t just stem from being out of touch, but from the fact that human psychology tends towards over-active punishment impulses; impulses that may go beyond what is proportionate; are exacerbated by the sense someone “continues to get away with it”; are difficult to modify with evidence; are increased when leveled against an abstract “Them”; and may be undertaken even when risking costs outweighing benefits. In such a context, the apoplexy and disbelief of The Establishment on “both sides” is a feature, not a bug; and the fact that “their candidate” (Trump) may not even be dependable to bring benefits poses little obstacle if a big part of the point, alongside “shaking things up,” is to punish those who are perceived to have benefitted from resisting all attempted shake-ups before.